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Abstract
The paper presents an evolutionary game-theoretic approach to open
access publishing as an asymmetric game between scientists and pub-
lishers. We show how the ordinary differential equations of the model
presented can be written as a system of Hamiltonian partial differential
equations. The understanding of the setting as a Hamiltonian system im-
plies some properties reflecting the qualitative behavior of the system.
1 Introduction
The topic of open access publishing has been extensively and controversially dis-
cussed. For general information see, for instance, [11, 12, 13]. There are many
models of open access named after different colors such as golden or green roads
to open access [2, 10], but we do not want to go into more details, here. Con-
cerning scientific publishing particularly in mathematics, we refer to [1, 7] and
[9] as well as to the references therein.
In [4] the authors illustrate a game-theoretic approach to open access publishing
in order to understand different publication patterns within different scientific
disciplines. The underlying observation is that there are communities where
open access publishing is widely adopted, whereas other scientific communities
are far away from practicing any open access publishing. First, different classical
game settings are discussed namely a zero sum game, a game similar to the
Prisoners’ Dilemma (up to sign), and a stag hunt game version, all describing a
Nash equilibrium dilemma of the non-open access communities. Second, these
classical settings are transferred into their quantum game extensions which allow
to tackle the dilemma mentioned that cannot be solved within the classical
setting.
The classical approach in [4] is formulated as a two-player game where the
players are authors (scientists) in symmetrical situations. The two authors have
the same set {s1, s2} of strategies at their disposal. Consequently, the game looks
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exactly the same to both of its players. For the open access game each player
has to decide between the option to publish open access as the first strategy s1
or, as the second strategy s2, to conventionally publish in traditional journals
where articles go through peer reviewing. Depending on the strategy chosen by
the co-player, the players aim to maximize their success of the game. Due to
the symmetric situation both players do not only have the same set of strategies
but also have the same payoff matrices.
In contrast to the approach of a symmetric two-scientists game, the present
paper attempts to explain mathematically the open access play as a conflict
of interest between scientists and publishers, as it is emphasized by the rapidly
accumulating literature on open access and electronic publishing. Assuming that
the open access problem is not a conflict between those scientists who publish
open access and those who do not, one takes the view that it is more adequate
to understand the problem of open access as an asymmetric conflict between
scientists and publishers.
The crucial point of this view is that it actually suggests a bimatrix game
describing this asymmetric setting.
We do not explain why both players – scientists and publishers – behave as they
do in the game situation described, but we will give a mathematical description
of their interaction in the game. Moreover, we do not argue for preferences in
choosing one game strategy over another.
2 The Game Setting
We consider scientists and publishers as players in different positions them hav-
ing different strategy sets as well as different payoff matrices. Moreover, we take
into consideration whole populations of players parts of which choose either one
or the other strategy.
The set of pure strategies for the scientists is {s1, s2}, where s1 is publishing open
access and s2 stands for conventional publishing. Furthermore, let 0 ≤ x1 ≤ 1
and 0 ≤ x2 ≤ 1 denote the relative parts of the scientists’ population playing
strategy s1 and s2, respectively. If, for example, half of all scientists publishes
open access and the other does not, one has x1 = x2 =
1
2
. Or, if the relation
is 20% to 80%, then x1 =
1
5
and x2 =
4
5
. Since x1 and x2 describe relative
frequencies, we see that x1 + x2 = 1 always holds true. Hence, the set of all
possible mixed strategies for the scientists’ population is
S =
{
x =
(
x1
x2
)
∈ R2 : 0 ≤ x1, x2 ≤ 1 and x1 + x2 = 1
}
.
The opponent population of publishers consists of two types playing pure strate-
gies {p1, p2}. Here strategy p1 means the publisher accepts or realizes open access
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publishing, whereas p2 represents the strategy of definite declining any way of
open access. For the publishers’ population let yi be the frequency of strategy pi,
where i = 1, 2. Thus, all possible mixed strategies for the publishers’ population
are given by the set
P =
{
y =
(
y1
y2
)
∈ R2 : 0 ≤ y1, y2 ≤ 1 and y1 + y2 = 1
}
.
In order to discuss the conflict of open access publishing, we proceed with estab-
lishing the payoff matrices A for the scientists and B for the publishers. Each
payoff depends on the strategies chosen by the participating players. A player
in the scientists’ population using strategy si against a player from the publish-
ers’ population using strategy pj obtains the payoff aij , whereas the opponent
obtains bji, with i, j = 1, 2.
As reasoned in [4], it is convenient to assume that the scientist tries to maxi-
mize his scientific reputation. Let R > 0 denote the reputation payoff that the
scientist is awarded. This payoff will be slightly reduced by 0 < r < R in case of
publishing open access. Hence, we still have R− r > 0 for the total reputation.
In addition, we take into consideration the impact of an article by the scientist.
The impact gives some payoff I > 0 both for the scientist and for the publisher.
Further, this impact obviously will reduce by some 0 < ι < I, if the concerning
journal is not sufficiently available. Moreover, we assume that ι < r saying that
the reduced impact in case of non-open access publishing is smaller than the
loss of reputation in case of open access publishing. Open access publishing will
cause expenses L > 0 that are shared equally by both players if both play their
open access strategy. Furthermore, G > 0 expresses some moderate journal price
scientists have to pay for library subscriptions as well as the compensation for
expenses of the publisher. Finally, let us introduce P > 0 for exorbitant profit
representing the prices of the most expensive journals coupled with continuing
non-open access publishing and taking the tremendously increasing fees for ac-
cess for granted. For our considerations, we make the realistic assumption that
P is so large that the inequality
G+ P − L > r − ι (2.1)
holds true, which is equivalent to
G+ P > L+ r − ι .
We already have r − ι > 0 and the open access expenses L actually cannot
exceed the upper bound given by this inequality.
If an open access publishing scientist meets a publisher accepting open access,
the scientist will get his reduced reputation, his research impact, and will pay
for maintaining some open access publishing system as well as for the journal
subscription. The publisher takes the price for the journal subscription and some
amount given by the impact. Apart from this, the publisher contributes to some
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extent to open access. Hence, the payoff is (R− r) + I −
L
2
−G for the scientist
and G+ I −
L
2
for the publisher.
If the scientist’s strategy is open access whereas the publisher plays the non-
open access strategy, the scientist’s payoff will be (R− r) + I − L. The scientists
have to run the open access completely by themselves and do not have any
expenses for journal subscriptions. For the publisher nothing happens and hence
the payoff is 0.
A non-open access publishing scientist gets his full reputation R but only re-
duced research impact I − ι. Additionally, the journal has to be paid, which
reduces the payoff by G. If the publisher’s counter-strategy is open access,
the payoff for the scientist will be R+ (I − ι)−G. In this case the payoff
for the publisher will be G+ (I − ι)− L paying the total sum for open access
acceptance. Moreover, the payoff is R+ (I − ι)−G− P for the scientist and
G+ (I − ι) + P for the publisher in case of the non-open access strategy of the
publisher.
Altogether, we have the complete income-and-loss statement as given in Table 1.
Table 1: Complete payoffs
payoff payoff
strategies for the scientist for the publisher
s1 ←→ p1 (R− r) + I −
L
2
−G G+ I −
L
2
s1 ←→ p2 (R − r) + I − L 0
s2 ←→ p1 R+ (I − ι)−G G+ (I − ι)− L
s2 ←→ p2 R+ (I − ι)−G− P G+ (I − ι) + P
Hence, the corresponding payoff matrices are
A =
(
a11 a12
a21 a22
)
=

 (R − r) + I −
L
2
−G (R − r) + I − L
R+ (I − ι) −G R+ (I − ι)−G− P


4
and
B =
(
b11 b12
b21 b22
)
=

 G+ I −
L
2
G+ (I − ι)− L
0 G+ (I − ι) + P

 .
Now, both payoff matrices determine the payoffs for the entire populations. For
a general description of how this happens we warmly recommend the book [5]
by Hofbauer and Sigmund. The corresponding strategies are spread within both
populations in accordance with the frequencies of the strategies. Hence, if the
scientists’ population is in state x ∈ S and the publishers’ population is in state
y ∈ P , then the payoff for the entire population of scientists will be
〈x , Ay〉 = xTAy
and that for the publishers’ population will be
〈y , Bx 〉 = yTBx = xTBTy .
As already mentioned, players will choose their game strategies with the inten-
tion of maximizing their average payoff. This would be easy if one knew the
strategy that the opponent player is going to choose. In case both players of the
game choose simultaneously strategies of best reply to the choices of the others,
a pair of strategies occurs where both players are incited to keep going into the
same direction. Such a pair of strategy choices is known as Nash equilibrium.
This is technically expressed by the following definition.
Definition 2.1 A Nash equilibrium is a pair (x, y) ∈ S × P such that
x
TAy ≤ xTAy for all x ∈ S
as well as
y
TBx ≤ yTBx for all y ∈ P
is fulfilled.
The following considerations aim to give a Nash equilibrium for our open access
game setting.
Lemma 2.2 Each of the differences a12−a22, a21−a11, b22−b21, and b11−b12
is positive.
Proof. Indeed,
a12 − a22 = −r − L+ ι+G+ P > 0
by (2.1) and
a21 − a11 = −ι+ r +
L
2
> 0
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by r > ι. Furthermore,
b22 − b21 = G+ I − ι+ P
which is positive since I > ι. Finally,
b11 − b12 =
L
2
+ ι
which is obviously positive. 
Lemma 2.3 Let (x, y) ∈ S × P be given by
x =
(
x0
1− x0
)
and y =
(
y0
1− y0
)
,
where
x0 =
b22 − b12
b22 − b12 + b11 − b21
and y0 =
a12 − a22
a12 − a22 + a21 − a11
.
Then
x
TAy = xTAy for all x ∈ S
and
y
TBx = yTBx for all y ∈ P
hold true.
Proof. First, by Lemma 2.2 both denominators of the fractions defining x0 and
y0 are positive. Then we have
Ay =
(
a11 a12
a21 a22
)(
y0
1− y0
)
=
(
y0(a11 − a12) + a12
y0(a21 − a22) + a22
)
=
detA
a12 − a22 + a21 − a11
(
1
1
)
as well as
Bx =
(
b11 b12
b21 b22
)(
x0
1− x0
)
=
(
x0(b11 − b12) + b12
x0(b21 − b22) + b22
)
=
− detB
b22 − b12 + b11 − b21
(
1
1
)
.
Hence,
x
TAy =
detA
a12 − a22 + a21 − a11
(x+ (1 − x)) =
detA
a12 − a22 + a21 − a11
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does not depend on x =
(
x
1− x
)
and
y
TBx =
detB
b12 − b22 + b21 − b11
(y + (1− y)) =
detB
b12 − b22 + b21 − b11
is independent of y =
(
y
1− y
)
. 
Corollary 2.4 The pair (x, y) ∈ S × P given in Lemma 2.3 is a Nash equilib-
rium. 
Remark 2.5 For this game there is no strict, i.e. given by pure strategies, Nash
equilibrium. The Nash equilibrium (x , y) ∈ S × P specified in Lemma 2.3 is a
unique mixed Nash equilibrium and determined by the following equations, c.f.
[5], Chapter 10.2 (Page 116, above),
a11y0 + a12(1− y0) = a21y0 + a22(1 − y0)
b11x0 + b12(1− x0) = b21x0 + b22(1− x0) .

3 The Dynamics of the Game
Due to the payoffs of the game, there is an intrinsic dynamics within the system.
Actually, starting for instance with the situation that the scientist has chosen
strategy s1 whereas the publisher’s strategy is p1, the outcome is
(R− r) + I −
L
2
−G
for the scientist and
G+ I −
L
2
for the publisher. In this situation the scientist could increase his payoff by
changing his strategy to s2, since r − ι > 0 and L > 0. Indeed, the inequality
R− r + I −
L
2
−G < R+ I − ι−G
is equivalent to
−
L
2
< r − ι ,
which holds true obviously for r − ι > 0 and L > 0. After this change in the
scientist’s strategy the payoff is
R+ I − ι−G
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for the scientist. Holding strategy p1 the publisher’s payoff is
G+ (I − ι)− L .
In this situation, the publisher sees the chance to change strategy to p2. The
reason is that the publisher’s payoff of G+ (I − ι)−L in the game s2 ↔ p1 can
be increased to G + (I − ι) + P in a game s2 ↔ p2. In fact, L > 0 and P > 0
give
G+ (I − ι)− L < G+ (I − ι) + P .
However, finding oneself in the situation of the game s2 ↔ p2 the scientist
notices that G and P are unnecessary costs, L would not be so huge and the
loss of reputation will be moderate. Hence, the scientist will prefer to choose
strategy s1. Altogether, changing strategies in order to maximize outcome ends
up moving in a circle.
The dynamics for pairs of pure strategies looks like
(s1, p1) ← (s1, p2)
↓ ↑
(s2, p1) → (s2, p2)
where the horizontal arrows picture the change of the publishers’ strategies and
the vertical arrows illustrate the deviation in the scientists’ strategies.
This dealing with an “oscillating” system requires a non-static approach. There-
fore, we consider the frequencies of the strategies within both populations
as time-dependent quantities which are differentiable functions of t ∈ R, i.e.
xi = xi(t) and yj = yj(t) for i, j = 1, 2. The first derivatives of these functions
x˙i =
dxi
dt
and y˙j =
dyj
dt
for i, j = 1, 2
describe the rate of growth of the respective frequencies.
Modeling the dynamics and the cyclic behavior of that system, we follow the
ideas of Hofbauer and Sigmund developed in [5], Chapter 10.3. The increase of
strategy si of the scientists’ population is given by the per capita growth rate
x˙i
xi
and equals the difference between its payoff (Ay)i and the average payoff
x
TAy . The same holds true for the publishers’ population. This leads to the
system of ordinary differential equations
x˙i = xi
(
(Ay)i − x
TAy
)
y˙j = yj
(
(BTx )j − y
TBTx
)
for i, j = 1, 2.
Let us look closer at these differential equations. We have
Ay =
(
a11 a12
a21 a22
)(
y1
y2
)
=
(
a11y1 + a12y2
a21y1 + a22y2
)
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and
BTx =
(
b11 b21
b12 b22
)(
x1
x2
)
=
(
b11x1 + b21x2
b12x1 + b22x2
)
.
Hence,
(Ay)i − x
TAy = y1(ai1 − x1a11 − x2a21) + y2(ai2 − x1a12 − x2a22)
and
(BTx )j − y
TBTx = x1(b1j − y1b11 − y2b12) + x2(b2j − y1b21 − y2b22) .
Since x1 + x2 = 1 and y1 + y2 = 1, it is admissible to introduce new variables
x := x1 and y := y1 (then x2 = 1 − x and y2 = 1 − y) and consider the
corresponding differential equations for x and y. These are
x˙ = x˙1
= x1
(
(Ay)1 − x
TAy
)
= x (y1(a11 − x1a11 − x2a21) + y2(a12 − x1a12 − x2a22))
= x (y(a11 − xa11 − (1− x)a21) + (1− y)(a12 − xa12 − (1− x)a22))
= x(1 − x) (y(a11 − a21) + (1 − y)(a12 − a22))
= x(1 − x) ((a12 − a22)− (a12 − a22 + a21 − a11)y)
and similarly
y˙ = y˙1 = y(1− y) (−(b22 − b21) + (b22 − b21 + b11 − b12)x) .
Now, let us introduce new constants by
a := a12 − a22
b := a21 − a11
c := b22 − b21
d := b11 − b12 ,
which are positive by Lemma 2.2. Hence, only two equations are remaining
namely
x˙ = x(1− x)(a− (a+ b)y) (3.1)
y˙ = y(1− y)(−c+ (c+ d)x) . (3.2)
This is an adequate form for investigating the qualitative behavior of the system.
The subsequent section is devoted to a further investigation of the dynamics of
the system given by Equations (3.1) and (3.2).
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4 Symplectic Reformulation
We consider the square Q = {(x, y) ∈ R2 : 0 ≤ x, y ≤ 1}. Obviously, Q ∼= S×P
by
(x, y) ∈ Q 7→
((
x
1− x
)
,
(
y
1− y
))
∈ S × P .
We use symplectic techniques for investigating what happens in the inte-
rior intQ of Q. More precisely, in order to prove that the orbits of the Sys-
tem (3.1) and (3.2) are closed and do not leave intQ we describe the whole
setting as a Hamiltonian system.
The interior of Q is the open subset
M = {(x, y) ∈ R2 : 0 < x, y < 1}
of R2. The function ϕ :M → R given by ϕ(x, y) = xy(1− x)(1− y) is positive.
Hence,
ω =
1
ϕ
dx ∧ dy
defines a 2-form ω on M .
Since we are in dimension 2 the following is clear.
Lemma 4.1 The pair (M,ω) is a symplectic manifold. 
We are going to derive that Equations (3.1) and (3.2) are the equations of motion
of the Hamiltonian system (M,ω,H) where the Hamiltonian H : M → R is
defined as
H(x, y) = c ln(x) + d ln(1− x) + a ln(y) + b ln(1− y) for (x, y) ∈M .
The notion of Hamiltonian systems is well-known and widely used in mathe-
matical physics to describe the behavior of systems in classical mechanics. In
physics the Hamiltonian H describes the energy of the system under consider-
ation. Hence, it would be interesting to understand, what intrinsic property is
determined by the “energy” of open access publishing.
Lemma 4.2 The Hamiltonian vector field of (M,ω,H) is given by
XH =


ϕ
∂H
∂y
−ϕ
∂H
∂x

 .
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Proof. Generally, XH is defined by the equation
ω(XH , ) = dH .
Clearly,
dH =
∂H
∂x
dx+
∂H
∂y
dy .
If V is any vector field on M with functions v1 and v2 as components, then
ω(V, ) =
1
ϕ
dx ∧ dy(V, ) =
1
ϕ
{v1dy − v2dx} .
Hence,
ω(V, ) = dH
if and only if
∂H
∂x
= −
1
ϕ
v2 and
∂H
∂y
=
1
ϕ
v1 ,
which proves the assertion. 
Let us remind that motions of the Hamiltonian System (M,ω,H) are curves
γ(t) in M satisfying the differential equation
d
dt
γ(t)|t=s = XH(γ(s)) .
Altogether, we now can prove the following proposition.
Proposition 4.3 The solutions of (3.1) and (3.2) are exactly the motions of
the Hamiltonian system (M,ω,H).
Proof. We have
ϕ
∂H
∂y
= xy(1− x)(1 − y)
{
a
y
−
b
1− y
}
= ax(1− x)(1 − y)− bxy(1− x)
= x(1− x)(a− ay − by)
and
−ϕ
∂H
∂x
= −xy(1− x)(1 − y)
{
c
x
−
d
1− x
}
= −cy(1− x)(1 − y) + dxy(1 − y)
= y(1− y)(−c+ cx+ dx) .
Thus, Equations (3.1) and (3.2) are equivalent to
ϕ
∂H
∂y
= x˙ and − ϕ
∂H
∂x
= y˙ ,
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which implies the statement by Lemma 4.2. 
As a consequence, the solutions in M of the System (3.1) and (3.2) correspond
to level set curves of the Hamiltonian H , i.e. the Hamiltonian H is constant
along solutions.
Corollary 4.4 Let (x(t), y(t)) give a solution of Equations (3.1) and (3.2).
Then
d
dt
H(x(t), y(t)) = 0 .
Proof. Indeed,
d
dt
H(x(t), y(t)) =
=
d
dt
{c ln(x(t)) + d ln(1− x(t)) + a ln(y(t)) + b ln(1− y(t))}
= c
x˙
x
− d
x˙
1− x
+ a
y˙
y
− b
y˙
1− y
= (c(1 − x)− dx)(a− (a+ b)y) + (a(1 − y)− by)(−c+ (c+ d)x)
= (c− cx− dx)(a− ay − by) + (a− ay − by)(−c+ cx+ dx)
= 0
by using (3.1) as well as (3.2) for replacing x˙ and y˙. 
In the remainder of this section we want to discuss the shape of the level set
curves of H . In particular, we will show that these curves are closed, which
implies that the solutions of (3.1) and (3.2) are periodic.
First, we are going to determine the extremal points of H . By
∂H
∂y
=
a
y
−
b
1− y
and
∂H
∂x
=
c
x
−
d
1− x
we obtain
a
y0
=
b
1− y0
and
c
x0
=
d
1− x0
as necessary conditions for a critical point (x0, y0). This leads to
y0 =
a
a+ b
and x0 =
c
c+ d
which corresponds exactly to our Nash equilibrium described in Lemma 2.3. By
∂2H
∂2x
= −
c
x2
−
d
(1− x)2
,
∂2H
∂2y
= −
a
y2
−
b
(1− y)2
, and
∂2H
∂x∂y
=
∂2H
∂y∂x
= 0 ,
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we have
∂2H
∂2x
(x0, y0) = −
(c+ d)3
cd
< 0 and
∂2H
∂2y
(x0, y0) = −
(a+ b)3
ab
< 0
at the point (x0, y0). This implies that the matrix
HessH(x0,y0) =

 −
(c+ d)3
cd
0
0 −
(a+ b)3
ab


is negative definite showing that H takes in (x0, y0) a maximum as the unique
extremum. Second, since
lim
t→0+
ln(t) = −∞
we have
lim
(x,y)→q
H(x, y) = −∞
for each q in the boundary ∂Q of Q. Hence, the graph of the Hamiltonian H
looks like a hill over the square Q.
0,8
-11
-10
0,2
-9
-8
-7
0,6
-6
0,4
x
y0,40,6 0,20,8
Figure 1: Graph of the Hamiltonian H with parameters a = 1, b = 2, c = 2, and d = 3
The top of the hill represents the unique maximum. Towards the boundary ∂Q,
the hill crashes into bottomless depths.
Since all solutions of our system correspond to level set curves, they are visual-
ized as contour lines of the hill described. Hence, all orbits surround the point
(x0, y0) and remain in M .
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0,5 0,70,60,3
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0,2
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0,40,2
Figure 2: Periodic orbits surrounding the Nash equilibrium (x0, y0) with parameters a = 1,
b = 2, c = 2, and d = 3
5 Further Discussion
Obviously, the model presented here is a basic approach to discuss the phe-
nomenon of multiple arrangements of realizing open access publishing in differ-
ent scientific communities. However, in contrast to the approach presented in [4]
it treats open access publishing in a canonical way as a game between scientists
and publishers. The behavior of oscillation on closed orbits is a rather rough
and simplified view of the whole scenario. We do not consider this model to be
universally valid, but throughout a certain period of time it seems to allow a
reasonably satisfying description of insights which are intuitively clear.
This model can be modified. For instance, taking into account that both the
parameter r reducing the scientist’s reputation in case of open access publishing
and the value of ι expressing the reduced impact in case of non-open access
publishing may change in the context of the game. For example, if the rate of
open access publishing scientists increases, r will be supposed to decrease etc.
Playing a little bit and slightly altering the model presented here may result in
further refinements.
Moreover, the huge number of evolutionary game-theoretic approaches in the lit-
erature allows a lot of modifications and further developments of these concepts.
They vary from biological game theory to concepts that are more applicable in
economic contexts. These models are good sources and suitable to establish fur-
ther improvements in a more fundamental manner, see e.g. [3, 6] and [8] as well
as the references therein.
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